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Abstract
Background:  Although selection favors exploitative competition within groups, a group of
hypercompetitive individuals may be less productive than a cooperative group. When competition
is costly for group fitness, among-group selection can favor groups with 'policing' individuals who
reduce within-group competition at a cost to their own fitness, or groups of individuals who
restrain their competitive intensity ('self policing'). We examine these possibilities in a series of
explicit population-genetic models.
Results: By comparing results from models of half and full sib structured populations, we find that
increased relatedness increases the strength of among-group selection against competition
genotypes, and increases the strength of among group selection favoring policing genotypes.
However, the strength of selection favoring costly policing behavior also increases with increased
levels of competition. When levels of competition and policing feedback on one another, groups
with lower levels of relatedness can favor higher levels of costly policing.
Conclusion: The result of the joint selection on policing and competition leads to results different
from those based on the evolution of policing alone. Our model makes 'long term' predictions
equivalent to those of optimization models, but we also show the existence of protected
polymorphisms of police and civilians, as well as competitors and non-competitors.
Background
A major impediment to the evolution of productive social
interactions is what Hardin [1] termed "The Tragedy of the
Commons" (TOC). Because individual self-interest favors
unfettered exploitation of a resource, whenever two or
more individuals share a common environment and
make simultaneous demands on its resources, conditions
are ripe for the TOC. Opportunities for the TOC include
groups of microbes living in the same host, offspring
within the same family, and genes in the same organism
[2]. Wright ([3] p. 129), Wynne-Edwards ([4] p. 623) and
Hamilton [5] viewed the TOC as the problem of control-
ling cheaters, lest they lead to the destruction of the group
(see also [6-8]).
Resolution of this tension between the interests of the
group and the individual allows major evolutionary tran-
sitions, wherein communities of individuals merge into a
single functional unit [8-11]. The processes proposed for
resolving this tension are kin selection for altruism and
enforced cooperation via policing. These are viewed as
alternatives, since the former is facilitated by high levels of
genetic relatedness among group members, while the lat-
ter is favored by low levels of relatedness. Although group
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selection works best with high levels of relatedness, "con-
trary to simple expectation" ([12] p. 42), policing theory
[13,14] and data from vespid wasps [15,16] indicate that
the highest levels of policing occur in groups with the low-
est levels of genetic relatedness. Hence, policing is viewed
as a mechanism for integrating groups of unrelated indi-
viduals, while altruism is seen a mechanism for cohesion
in related groups [2,12-14,17,18].
In this paper, we use explicit population genetic models to
show that costly policing is favored by selection among
groups and opposed by selection within groups in propor-
tion to relatedness among group members in the same
manner as kin-selected altruism: although altruistic and
enforced cooperation may be alternative mechanisms for
group cohesion, they evolve by the same evolutionary
process. We examine the evolution of individual compet-
itive ability and policing in the first two-trait model of
individual and group selection. Individual selection
within groups favors enhanced competitive ability but
opposes costly policing. Conversely, group selection
opposes the evolution of competitive ability but favors
the evolution of policing.
Unlike previous optimization treatments of policing, our
explicit genetic model reveals stable interior equilibria as
well as the rate of progress toward them. Owing to the
multiplicative nature of the group-mean fitness function
(a pres [13]), many combinations of competition and
policing have equal fitnesses. Although mutation analysis
reveals that these interior equilibria are invasible and can
move toward the global optima found by Frank [13], evo-
lutionary progress toward the global equilibrium is
exceedingly slow, on the order of the square of the inverse
of the mutation rate, because it depends upon the order of
occurrence of competition and policing mutations. These
global optima may exist but few species will endure long
enough to guarantee arrival at them.
Ratnieks [19] coined the term, 'policing' in the context of
social insect colonies where worker females lay haploid,
male eggs that are often eaten by other workers. Policing
behaviors can mitigate the individually beneficial and the
communally detrimental effects of individual selfishness
([2,13,14,20]). When individuals engage in mutual polic-
ing at some cost to themselves, the group as a whole func-
tions as an evolutionary unit, as in the social insects,
where "Worker policing ... may be selected due to the col-
ony-level benefit of conflict suppression" ([21] p. 169).
Additionally, policing is thought to be particularly impor-
tant in the maintenance of sociality in higher primates.
Alexander [22] argued that socially imposed rules and tra-
ditions favor group-level efficiency in humans, and Flack
and colleagues have found evidence for the importance of
policing in the coherence of groups of pigtailed macaques
[20,23].
Frank [2,13,14,17,18] was the first to formally examine
the co-evolutionary interplay between competitive and
policing behaviors. In the simplest version of his model,
Frank [13] envisions that each individual has two quanti-
tative traits, policing and competition. The fitness, wij, of
the jth individual in the ith group is given by the function
where zij is the competitive ability of the jth individual and
zi. is the mean competitive ability of individuals in group
i. Similarly, aij is the amount of policing by the jth individ-
ual in the ith group and ai. is the average level of policing
within group i. The constant, c, represents the cost of
policing to the individual and it is assumed to be the same
for all individuals. Individual fitness increases as zij
increases and is favored by selection within groups. How-
ever, mean group fitness is a declining function of mean zi
and is opposed by among group selection.
Analyzing the optima of eq. [1], Frank found that: (1)
mean competitive ability decreases with increasing relat-
edness; and, (2) mean level of policing increases with
increased competition. We use Frank's fitness model in
our investigation of the evolution of competition and
policing in populations composed of either full or half sib
families. We examine these different levels of relatedness
in order to explore directly how relatedness affects the
evolution of policing and competition. We partition total
selection into within and among group components [24]
to make the levels of selection explicit and show how the
major findings of Frank [13] emerge from the conflicting
forces of selection within and between groups. Unlike
Frank [11] we find many stable interior equilibria, in
which extreme competitors coexist with less competitive
genotypes, and effective police coexist with civilians; sug-
gesting that a population need not necessarily arrive at the
monomorphic state predicted by Frank [13]. Moreover,
we find that like multiplicative selection functions of two-
locus individual selection, joint selection on competitive
and policing alleles does not generate linkage-disequilib-
rium, and thus the hyper-competitive genotypes are
equally likely to be police or civilians.
Methods and Results
General Approach
In our model, policing and competition only occur within
sibling groups. This can be visualized as competition over
a resource proximal to the location where offspring are
raised, or competition over maternal resources. After sib-
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lings mature, they leave this locale, mix with other mem-
bers of the population and mate randomly, with no
further selection on levels of competition or policing.
To further simplify analysis, we assume a large population
in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, and we ignore the effects
of mutation, migration, and random genetic drift. For
each model, we identify all parental mating types and
their respective frequencies, the offspring genotypes from
each mating type, and the change in genotype frequencies
within each family that result from the fitness costs and
benefits of competition and policing. Next, we calculate
mean absolute fitness of each family. From these values,
we calculate the changes in gene frequency due to selec-
tion within sib groups, selection among sib groups, and
the total change in gene frequency per generation. We
complement our technical treatments by concluding each
model with a qualitative summary of our findings.
Model 1: The Evolution of Competitive Ability
We envision a population with no policing where an indi-
vidual's level of competition is controlled by one locus
with two alleles with additive affects. Let allele A occur in
frequency p and the alternative allele, a, in frequency q =
(1 - p), so that, after random mating, AA, Aa, and aa indi-
viduals are in frequencies p2, 2pq, and q2, respectively. Let
AA  individuals have a baseline competitive ability
denoted by z0. Adding an a  allele to the genotype,
increases competitive ability by an amount, za. Thus, Aa
individuals compete at the level z0 + za, while aa individ-
uals compete at the level, z0 + 2za. Mean competitive abil-
ity of the population equals z0 + 2qza.
Model 1A: Competition Without Policing
Population-genetic dynamics
Setting ai. = aij = 0 in eq. [1] (to reflect no policing), the fit-
ness of an individual of genotype j in family-type i is
mean fitness in family i equals
wi. = 1 - zi. (3)
and mean fitness across all families is
We find the frequency of allele a after within family selec-
tion by taking the product of the frequency of each family
type (fi), the change in frequency of allele a due to selec-
tion within this family (∆qi), and the mean fitness of this
family (wi), summing across all family types and dividing
by   (see [25] for procedure). Assuming weak selection
as in Wade [24,25], we approximate fi from Hardy-Wein-
berg expectations, and thus solutions in text are approxi-
mations. In Additional file 1, we present the exact
solutions, which differ only slightly from the approximate
solutions as also found by Wade [25] for a very different
fitness function.
We subtract the frequency of allele a before selection to
find the change in q due to selection among and within
groups [26-28]
Total change in frequency of allele a (∆qtotal) is the sum of
eqs. [5] and [6]. Values of fi., ∆qi., qi., and wi. for full and
half sib families are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Table 3 shows mean fitness, as well as ∆q among
groups, within groups, and total (discussed below). w
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Table 1: Family frequencies, fitnesses, and change in frequency of competitive allele, full-sib families, no policing. From left to right: 
Family types, frequencies, frequency of offspring genotypes, allele frequency within families, mean offspring competitive intensity, 
family fitness, and change in frequency of competitive allele due to selection within the family.
Family Freq Offspring Genotypes Family Mean
AA Aa Aa qi. zi. = ziFS wi. ∆qi.
AA × AA p4 1- - - - - - 0 z 0 = z1FS 1-z1FS 0
AA × Aa 4p3q1 / 21 / 2 - - - 1 / 4 z 0+za/2 = z2FS 1-z2FS za/8z2FS
AA × aa 2p2q2 --- 1 --- 1/2 z0+za = z3FS 1-z3FS 0
Aa × Aa 4p2q2 1/4 1/2 1/4 1/2 z0+za = z4FS 1-z4FS za/4z4FS
Aa × aa 4pq3 --- 1/2 1/2 3/4 z0+3za/2 = z5FS 1-z5FS za/8z5FS
aa × aa q4 --- --- 1 1 z0+2za = z6FS 1-z6FS 0BMC Evolutionary Biology 2007, 7:203 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/7/203
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Inputting values from Tables 1 and 2 into eq. [5], we find
that selection between families always favors a decrease in
competition, regardless of gene frequency, degree of com-
petition, or family type (half sib or full sib). For half sib
families,  , and is exactly half as strong
as among group selection against competition in full sib
families   as found in many other the-
oretical studies of kin selection [26-28].
Inputting values from Tables 1 and 2 into eq. [6], we find
that comparing results of selection within groups (Table
3, Row 3) is more complicated. Subtracting ∆qwithin_FS
from  ∆qwithin_HS  yields
. Thus, the difference in the strength of within group selec-
tion depends on allele frequency, as well as the level of
competition. Specifically, when q < 0.5 and z2hs < 1.0,
within-group selection favoring competition will be
stronger for half-sib families than it is for full-sib families;
however, as q rises above 1/2 and z2hs rises above 1,
within-group selection favoring competition can be
stronger for full-sib families than it is for half-sib families.
Since z2HS cannot exceed 1 in this model, the force of
within-group selection can only be stronger in a popula-
tion of full-sib than half-sib families if the competitive
allele is very common.
The formula for total selection on competitive ability is
similarly complicated (Table 3, Row 5). Subtracting ∆qtotal
full-sib from ∆qtotal  half-sib yields
. Since selection on competition is dependent on z0, za and
q, it is difficult to interpret the effect of family structure on
evolution from this result.
Solving for optima
By solving for the equilibrium value of q* (setting ∆qtotal
= 0), and comparing results for half and full-sib families
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Table 2: Family frequencies, fitnesses, and change in frequency of competitive allele, half-sib families, no policing. From left to right: 
Family types, frequencies, frequency of offspring genotypes, allele frequency within families, mean offspring competitive intensity, 
family fitness, and change in frequency of competitive allele due to selection within the family.
Fam Freq Offspring Genotype Family Mean
AA Aa aa qi. zi. = ziHS wi. ∆qi.
AA P^2 P q --- (q/2) z0+qza = z1HS 1-z1HS pqza/2z1HS
Aa 2*p*q P/2 1/2 q/2 (q/2+1/4) z0+za(q+1/2) = z2HS 1-z2HS (pqza/2z2hs)+(za/8z2HS)
aa q^2 --- p q (q/2+1/2) z0+za(q+1) = z3HS 1-z3HS pqza/2z3HS
Table 3: Summary of Model 1A: Evolution of competitive ability with no policing. With no policing, a = ai. = aij = 0.
Half sib Full sib
Mean fitness ( ) 1 - (z0 + 2qza)1  -  ( z0 + 2qza)
∆q within groups (∆qw)
∆q between groups (∆qb) -pqza/4
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(Figure 1), we allow for simple interpretation of the effect
of population structure on the evolution of competitive
intensity.
Furthermore, with a few simplifying assumptions we
show that this approach provides the same results as
Frank [13,14]. We begin with a population fixed for allele
p, so that z.. = z0. We then introduce a rare mutant carrying
allele q and find ∆qtotal for both half and full sib families.
Figures 2a and 2b display the sign of ∆qtotal (when q is
rare) as a function of z0 and za for half and full sib families,
respectively. These figures are similar to the pairwise-inva-
sibility-plots of adaptive dynamics [29]; however, rather
than presenting zresident and zinvader we present z0 (which
can be thought of as zresident), and za (zinvader - zresident).
We can then obtain the stable level of competition, z*, by
setting ∆q = 0 and solving for z0 as za approaches zero. Let
z* represent the invasion equilibrium, the value of z0 at
which an invader with small levels of za does not change
in frequency. This equilibrium equals 3/4 for half sib fam-
ilies and 1/2 for full sib families, coincident with Frank's
solution that z* = 1 - r. For both family types, z* is both
evolutionarily and continuously stable, meaning that z*
cannot be invaded by a rare allele with any nonzero value
of za and, reciprocally, that a rare allele entering any mon-
omorphic population will increase in frequency if the
allele increases the level of competition and z0 is less than
z0*, or if the allele decreases the level of competition and
z0 is greater than z0*. If the mutant not only invades, but
is driven to fixation, then the population becomes mono-
morphic for a new level of competition, z0' which equals
z0 + za. Now if a new mutant allele, za, has a small effect
on the level of competition and z0 + za individuals are
closer to z0* than z0' this new value of za can spread and
now the sum of z0' + za becomes the new z0. A continua-
tion of this process will ultimately lead to the stable level
of competition, z0, described above.
Population-genetic constrains
However, we are not guaranteed that the evolution of
competitive behavior will follow the particular steps out-
Equilibrium frequency (q*) of a 'competitive' allele Figure 1
Equilibrium frequency (q*) of a 'competitive' allele. q* as a function of the base-line level of competition (z0) and the 
additive effect of the competitive allele (za). The equilibrium frequency, q* varies continuously from fixed to lost. Lines mark a 
change in q* of 0.2, and are labeled by numbers to their right.BMC Evolutionary Biology 2007, 7:203 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/7/203
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lined above. Of special interest is the observation that, for
many combinations of z0 and za, there exist a stable level
of q and p such that a dimorphism of competitive behav-
ior is maintained (Figures 1A and 1B display equilibrium
values of q for half and full sib families, respectively). We
can show that such a stable equilibrium is invasible by a
mutant with competitive ability closer to z* and resistant
to invasion by mutants with competitive ability further
from z* (in Additional file 3 we show the derivation of
this result for the full-sib model). However, we have not
explored the possibility of a new stable intermediate equi-
librium, involving 2 or more alleles, in between these
boundary analyses. Additionally, it is widely known that
complex genetic systems, with dominance, epistasis and
pleiotropy can act as constraints, preventing traits from
approaching their optima; we have not formally
addressed the influence of these factors in the evolution of
competitive intensity.
The evolutionary dynamics of competitive ability may
also deviate from the description above if competitive
ability interacts with another trait that affects the spread of
competition. Frank [2,13,14] added policing behavior to
the model of competition. Below, we also add a fixed level
of policing to this model and examine the evolutionary
interaction between these two traits.
Model 1B: Competition with a Fixed, Nonzero Level of 
Policing
Population-genetic dynamics
With a fixed level of policing (such that ai. = aij = a in eq.
[1]), the fitness of an individual of genotype j in family-
type i changes from eq. [2] to become
mean fitness in family i equals
wi. = (1 - zi.(1 - a))(1 - ca)( 8 )
and mean fitness across all families is
wz a a c a
z
z
ij i
ij
i
=− − () () − () +− () 11 1 1 .
.
() (7)
Invasibility of a 'competitive' allele Figure 2
Invasibility of a 'competitive' allele. Invasibility of competitive allele with additive effect, za, on its competitive intensity, in 
a population fixed for z0 competitive intensity. The sign, + denotes regions in which the competitive allele can invade when 
rare, the sign, - denotes regions in which it cannot.BMC Evolutionary Biology 2007, 7:203 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/7/203
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When policing is absent, (i.e., a = 0) eqs. [6-7] reduce to
eqs.[2-4]. Tables 4 and 5 show family characteristics
including frequencies, fitnesses and allele frequency
change for within full and half-sib families, respectively.
In Table 6, we show mean fitness, as well as the ∆q
approximate solutions for half and full-sib families.
Solving for optima
From the ∆q total expressions in Table 6 we derived z0*
for half and full-sib families. Frank ([13] – figure 1B)
shows that, when selection favors any level of policing,
(1) policing effort (a) will approach 1, and (2) the level of
competition will evolve to  . Here we address pre-
diction 2 by inserting the values, r = 1/2 and 3/4 for full
and half sib families, respectively, into Frank's prediction
and comparing it to our own derivation of z0*. As a → 1,
we find that the two approaches provide equivalent solu-
tions, namely,   and  .
Intriguingly, both solutions result in values of z* > 1,
which, in the absence of policing, would result in negative
fitnesses (see eqs. [2-4]). Values of z* in excess of 1 are
only possible with some level of policing already present
in the population, so that no families or individuals suffer
from w < 0. Frank ([14] p. 1166) explained this result as
follows:
"The high competitiveness in a policing situation is no dif-
ferent from high internal pressure in a fish that lives at
great depth. The fish brought to the surface explodes;
intense competition and avoidance of repressive policing
cause chaos when the same amount of energy is devoted to
competition in the absence of repressive policing. "
Although Frank's and our approaches provide equivalent
solutions for the level of competition in half and full-sib
structured populations with complete policing, some
information is lost in this comparison. Frank's approach
allows for the derivation of z* with any quantitative value
of r, while we have only solved for two specific values of
relatedness, r = 1/2 and r = 1/4. By contrast, our model
provides a prediction for the optimal level of competition
when the level of policing (a) lies between the two stable
solutions (1 and 0). Thus, the two derivations of z* pro-
vide complimentary solutions to the evolution of compet-
itive ability in a police state.
Summary of Model 1: The Evolution of Competitive Ability
We apply a family selection approach to the problem of
the evolution of interference competition. In the long
term, without 'policing,' we find that mean competitive
ability will approach a value of 1/2 for full-sib and 1/4 for
half-sib families, in agreement with previous research
[13]. However, we also discovered a plane of stable equ-
libria between competitive specialists and a less competi-
tive class. When a fixed level of policing behavior is added
to this model, the regions of stable equilibria are reduced
and a sharp increase in competitive ability is favored. In
some sense, although policing limits the expression of
competitive ability, the innate tendency to compete is
enhanced beyond that able to evolve in the absence of
policing: policing permits the evolution of more extreme
interference competition.
Model 2: The Evolution of Policing with a Fixed Level of 
Competition
We now examine the evolution of policing behavior in a
population with a fixed level of competition, assuming
that an individual's level of policing is controlled by one
locus with two alleles with additive affects. Let allele B
occur in frequency t and the alternative allele, b, in fre-
quency u = (1 - t), so that, after random mating, BB, Bb,
and bb individuals are in frequencies t2, 2tu, and u2,
respectively. Let BB individuals have a baseline level of
wz ac a =− − () () − () 11 1 . (9)
1
1
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− ()
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z
c HS a== ()
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Table 4: Family frequencies, fitnesses, and change in frequency of competitive allele, full-sib families, fixed policing = a. From left to 
right: Family types, frequencies, frequency of offspring genotypes, allele frequency within families, mean offspring competitive 
intensity, family fitness, and change in frequency of competitive allele due to selection within the family.
Family Freq (fi.) Offspring Genotypes Family Mean
AA Aa aa qi. zi. = ziFS wi. ∆qi.
AA × AA p4 1 --- --- 0 z0 = z1FS (1-ca)(1 -z1FS(1-a)) 0
AA × Aa 4p3q 1/2 1/2 --- 1/4 z0+za/2 = z2FS (1-ca)(1-z2FS(1-a)) za(1-a)/(8z2FS(1-ac))
AA × aa 2p2q2 --- 1 --- 1/2 z0+za = z3FS (1-ca)(1-z3FS(1-a)) 0
Aa × Aa 4p2q2 1/4 1/2 1/4 1/2 z0+za = z4FS (1-ca)(1-z4FS(1-a)) za(1-a)/(4z4FS(1-ac))
Aa × aa 4pq3 --- 1/2 1/2 3/4 z0+3za/2 = z5FS (1-ca)(1-z5FS(1-a)) za(1-a)/(8z5FS(1-ac))
aa × aa q4 --- --- 1 1 z0+2za = z6FS (1-ca)(1-z6FS(1-a)) 0BMC Evolutionary Biology 2007, 7:203 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/7/203
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policing denoted by a0. Adding a b allele to the genotype
increases policing effort by an amount, aa. Thus Bb indi-
viduals police at the level a0 + aa, while bb individuals
police at the level, a0 + 2aa. Mean policing effort of the
population equals a0+2uaa.
Population-genetic dynamics
In this model, policing decreases the benefit of competi-
tion to within-group fitness, and decreases the deleterious
effect of competition on between-group fitness. Following
[1], and setting z = zij = zi. = z.. to represent a fixed level of
competition, the fitness of the jth individual in the ith
group equals
wij = (1 - caij)(1 - z(1 - ai.)) (10)
the mean fitness of group i equals
wi. = (1 - cai.)(1 - z(1 - ai.)) (11)
and population mean fitness equals
where c and a represent the cost and degree of policing,
respectively, σ2
a_AF represents the among-family variance
in policing effort. For both half and full sib families, we
find the frequency of allele b after selection among and
within families following eqs. [5] and [6] respectively,
maintaining the same major assumptions, but substitut-
ing u for q. Values of fi., ∆ui., ui., and wi. for full and half-
sib family-structured populations are presented in Tables
7 and 8, respectively.
We find the surprising result that, unlike the model of
competition, with all else being equal, the  HS ≠  FS.
This result follows from the emergence of   in the deri-
vation of wi. (eq. [8]) – in replacing ai with   in eq. [9] we
substitute the square of the mean level of policing for the
mean of the squared level of policing. We therefore sub-
tract the difference between these values (i.e. the variance
in policing) multiplied by c and z. Since multiple mating
decreases the variance among maternal families,  HS ≥
FS. The difference between  HS  and  FS  equals
, which is zc times the difference in among-family
variance in policing effort for half and full-sib families
(Table 9).
Clearly, policing decreases the benefit of competition to
within-group fitness, and decreases the deleterious effect
of competition on between-group fitness; however, this
group-level benefit is mediated by the cost of policing.
The direction and magnitude of among-group selection
on policing effort (Table 9) reflects these opposing pres-
sures. For both half and full sib structured populations,
increased policing is favored by selection among groups
when the baseline level of policing [a0] is small – that is,
when  , and all other val-
ues are between 0 and 1.
Restricting this analysis to small values of aa, this result
reduces to:
Increasing the cost of policing [c] decreases the value of
the right hand side (RHS) of the eq. [10], limiting the
parameter space for which increased policing is favored by
between-group selection. In contrast, increasing the fixed
level of competition, [z] increases the RHS of eq. [10],
increasing the parameter space under which increased
policing is favored by between-group selection. Thus,
increased competition within groups facilitates the evolution of
policing by between-group selection.
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Table 5: Family frequencies, fitnesses, and change in frequency of competitive allele, half-sib families, fixed policing = a. From left to 
right: Family types, frequencies, frequency of offspring genotypes, allele frequency within families, mean offspring competitive 
intensity, family fitness, and change in frequency of competitive allele due to selection within the family.
Fam Freq Offspring Genotype Family Mean
AA Aa aa qi. zi = ziHS wi. ∆qi.
AA p^2 p q --- (q/2) z0+qza = z1HS (1-ca)(1-z1HS(1-a)) pqza(1-a)/(2z1HS(1-ac))
Aa 2*p*q p/2 1/2 q/2 (q/2+1/4) z0+za(q+1/2) = z2HS (1-ca)(1-z2HS(1-a)) ((za(1-a))/(z2HS(1-ac)))(1/8+pq/2)
aa q^2 --- p q (q/2+1/2) z0+za(q+1) = z3HS (1-ca)(1-z3HS(1-a)) pqza(1-a)/(2z3HS(1-ac))B
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Table 6: Summary of Model 1A: Evolution of competitive ability with fixed policing = a = ai = aij
Half sib Full sib
Mean fitness ( ) (1 - z(1 - a.))(1 - ca.)( 1  -  z(1 - a.))(1 - ca.)
∆q within groups (∆qw)
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A comparison of ∆uamongHS  with  ∆uamongFS  shows that
among-group selection favoring increased policing effort
is approximately twice as strong for full sib families as it is
for half sib families (Table 9, row 4). The exact difference
between  ∆uamongFS  with  ∆uamongHS  is
. The most important quali-
tative result from our derivation is that policing can be
favored by between group selection and increasing relat-
edness (while keeping all other variables constant)
strengthens the force of among-group selection favoring
policing.
While among-group selection can favor increased polic-
ing, within group selection always favors reduced levels of
policing (Table 9) Note that the claim that costless polic-
ing does not involve kin selection [30] is not substantiated
by our model: when the cost of policing (c) is set to 0,
there is no selection within groups and policing evolves
solely by among-group selection. The difference between
∆uwithinFS and ∆uwithinHS equals
It can be shown that ∆uwithinFS is greater than ∆uwithinHS
when  . Since within-group selection decreases
the frequency of a policing allele, and since z cannot be
greater than one unless there is already a significant level
of policing in the population, selection against policing is
initially stronger in populations consisting of half-sib
families than it is in populations of full-sib families, but
as the level of policing increases this difference dimin-
ishes. This result partially explains why half-sib families
can sustain high levels of policing – within-group selec-
tion against high levels of policing is weaker in half-sib
based populations than in full-sib based populations.
The difference between populations structured as full and
half-sib groups in the total change in policing-allele fre-
quency is the sum the differences between them from
selection within and between groups. Under most param-
eter values, policing is more strongly favored in full-sib
than in half-sib structured populations (Figure 3); again,
this is contrary to the beliefs that reduced relatedness
favors the evolution of policing and that the evolution of
policing is a process distinct from kin selection.
Solving for optima
Frank [13] found that the co-evolutionary system of com-
petition and policing moves towards one of two equi-
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Table 7: Family frequencies, fitnesses, and change in frequency of policing allele, full-sib families, fixed competition = z. From left to 
right: Family types, frequencies, frequency of offspring genotypes, allele frequency within families, mean offspring policing level, family 
fitness, and change in frequency of competitive allele due to selection within the family.
Family Freq Offspring Genotypes Family Mean
BB Bb bb ui ai = aiFS wi ∆ui.
BB × BB t4 -- --- --- 0 a0 = a1FS (1-ca1FS)(1-z(1-a1FS)) 0
BB × Bb 4t3u 1/2 1/2 --- 1/4 a0+aa/2 = a2FS (1-ca2FS)(1-z(1-a2FS)) -caa/(8(1-ca2FS))
BB × bb 2t2u2 --- 1 --- 1/2 a0+aa = a3FS (1-ca3FS)(1-z(1-a3FS)) 0
Bb × Bb 4t2u2 1/4 1/2 1/4 1/2 a0+aa = a4FS (1-ca4FS)(1-z(1-a4FS)) -caa/(4(1-ca4FS))
Bb × bb 4tu3 --- 1/2 1/2 3/4 a0+3aa/2 = a5FS (1-ca5FS)(1-z(1-a5FS)) -caa/(8(1-ca5FS))
bb × bb u4 --- --- 1 1 a0+2aa = a6FS (1-ca6FS)(1-z(1-a6FS)) 0
Table 8: Family frequencies, fitnesses, and change in frequency of policing allele, half-sib families, fixed competition = z. From left to 
right: Family types, frequencies, frequency of offspring genotypes, allele frequency within families, mean offspring policing level, family 
fitness, and change in frequency of competitive allele due to selection within the family.
Family Freq Offspring Genotypes Family Mean
BB bb b u i ai = aiHS wi. ∆ui
BB t2 t u --- (u/2) a0+uaa = a2HS (1-ca1HS)(1-z(1-a1HS)) -utcaa/2(1-ca1HS)
Bb 2tu t/2 1/2 u/2 (u/2 + 1/4) a0+aa(u+1/2) = a2HS (1-ca2HS)(1-z(l-a2HS)) -caa/(1 -ca2HS)(1/8+u*t/2)
bb u2 --- t u (u/2+1/2) a0+aa(u+1) = a3HS (1-ca3HS)(1-z(1-a3HS)) -utcaa/2(1-ca3HS)BMC Evolutionary Biology 2007, 7:203 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/7/203
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libria, depending on the cost of policing and the
population genetic structure. When relatedness is greater
than one minus the cost of policing, Frank's model pre-
dicts that there will be no policing and the level of compe-
tition (z*) will equal one minus relatedness. From our
derivation of ∆utotal, we find that an allele that increases
policing effort will only increase in frequency when
 for full sib families, and
when   for half sib fami-
lies.
Inserting values of z* found in the previous section (1/2
for full sib and 3/4 for half sib families) for z, an allele
which increases policing effort can increase in frequency
when   or
 for full and half sib based
populations, respectively. Beginning with no policing (a0
= 0), a rare mutant (u is small) with a small policing effort
(aa is small and positive) will only increase when c < 1/2
for full sib, or c < 3/4 for half sib structured populations.
This result is consistent with Frank's first equilibrium pre-
diction – when r > 1 - c, policing will not invade and the
system will be stable with zij = zi. = z.. = z* = 1 - r, and aij =
ai. = a.. = a* = 0.
We can also solve for the equilibrium value of a0* with a
fixed value of competition. For full sib structured popula-
tions,   and for half sib structured
populations  . Subtracting a0*  HS
from a0*  FS yields  , a number which is
generally positive, providing further support for the claim
that, all else equal, high relatedness favors higher levels of
policing.
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Change in frequency (∆u) of a 'policing' policing allele due to  selection within and among groups Figure 3
Change in frequency (∆u) of a 'policing' policing allele 
due to selection within and among groups. The sum of 
selection within and among groups equals the total change in 
allele frequency (∆u total). The policing allele has an additive 
effect (aa) of 0.2, and a cost (c) of 0.2. The population begins 
with no baseline level of policing (a0 = 0) and a 0.8 level of 
competition (z). q* as a function of the base-line level of com-
petition (z0) and the additive
Table 9: Summary of Model 2: Evolution of policing effort with fixed levels of competition = z.
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Summary of Model 2: The Evolution of Policing Effort
We apply a family selection approach to the problem of
the evolution of policing effort. Selection among families
generally increases the frequency of an allele that increases
policing effort, while selection within families always
decreases the frequency of a policing allele. Under identi-
cal parameters, selection among half sib groups favoring a
policing allele is twice as strong as the same selection
among a population of half-sib groups. By inserting equi-
librium values of z* from section 1A into our ∆u expres-
sions, we show that a nonzero level of policing can evolve
only when c < 1/2 and 3/4 for full and half- sib families,
respectively.
Model 3: The Co-evolution of Policing and Competition
Population-genetic dynamics
In this model we examine the co-evolution of competi-
tion and policing behavior. In this two-locus model we
retain the naming conventions in models 1 and 2. The fit-
ness of the jth in the ith group is given in eq. [1]. The mean
fitness of the ith family
wi. = (1 - cai.)(1 - zi(1 - ai.)) (15)
equals and the mean population fitness equals
Family tables are presented in Additional file 2.
The results of this model parallel results from models 1B
and 2. Mean population fitness, ∆u within families,
among families and total are equivalent to values in Table
9 with   replacing z. Similarly, ∆q within and among
families as well as ∆q total are equivalent to values listed
in 6, with   replacing a. No linkage disequilibrium is gen-
erated by selection either within or among groups, there-
fore the dynamics of the co-evolution of policing and
competition do not depend on whether they are jointly
polymorphic, or if the invasion of a new type occurs while
the other locus is monomorphic. As in models 1 and 2,
genetic constraints such as mutational step size, and dom-
inance can prevent populations from attaining these equi-
librium values.
Solving for optima
As in model 2, and as Frank [13,14] found, policing will
only evolve when r < 1 - c. When policing is favored by
selection, policing effort will rise above one, the biologi-
cal cap on the level of policing. By constraining the system
to avoid negative individual fitnesses (by keeping a < 1),
when policing is favored it will approach one and the level
of competition will approach that found in model 1B
(above).
Population-genetic constraints
Notably, although this two-gene, two-trait model makes
equivalent 'long-term' predictions as the single-trait based
approaches, this model places additional constraints on
the order and size of effect of mutations to competition
and policing, which may prohibit a population from
achieving the ultimate equilibria. That is large mutational
many mutations at one locus, that place a population
closer to long-term equilibria may be lost because the
appropriate trait values at the other locus do not yet exist.
Discussion and Conclusion
Conflict between the levels of selection is a classical prob-
lem of evolution theory [6,8,25,31-34]. Here, in formal
evolutionary genetic models, we investigated the evolu-
tion of two traits, interference competition and policing,
that, not only, interact to affect fitness but also are affected
by selection within and between groups, albeit in oppo-
site ways. The first trait, interference competition,
increases the fitness of individuals within groups but does
so at a cost to group fitness. The second trait, policing,
increases group mean fitness but at a cost to the fitness of
policing individuals within groups. By partitioning total
selection into within and among group components, we
showed how each level of selection contributes to the evo-
lutionary dynamics and long-term evolutionary outcome
of selection on policing and competition. We noted that
costless policing involves only selection among groups.
We found that competition is opposed by among-group
selection and decreases with higher levels of genetic relat-
edness: over all values of cost and for any given level of
policing, there is a negative relationship between compe-
tition and relatedness. That is, under identical parameters,
the equilibrium values of competition are always higher
for half-sib than for full-sib structured populations (Fig.
4a). As has been shown before [13,14,27], kin selection
opposes competition within kin groups. We also find that
interference competition with policing can evolve to a
level that exceeds its maximum value (z* = 1) without
policing, a finding similar to that of Frank [13,14]: a high
level of policing allows a high level of interference compe-
tition.
One of our novel findings is that policing is favoured by
among-group selection and it reaches higher values with
higher genetic relatedness within groups as we illustrate
graphically (Fig. 4). Thus, kin selection favors the evolu-
tion of policing: across a range of costs of policing and for
a given level of competition, the equilibrium level of
policing is higher for full-sib than for half-sib structured
populations (Fig. 4b). As well, the rate of increase of a
wc az a ii i a A F =− () −− () () − 11 1 2
.. _ σ (16)
z
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policing allele increases with genetic relatedness (Fig. 3).
We conclude that, although policing may be a different
mechanism than altruism for ensuring group coopera-
tion, it evolves by the same evolutionary process as altru-
ism, namely, kin selection.
We also find that, owing to the multiplicative nature of
the group-mean fitness function, the mean level of com-
petition has a strong influence on the equilibrium level of
policing and vice versa (Figs. 4c,d). However, the influ-
ences are not strictly reciprocal. The equilibrium level of
policing cannot rise above one (where it renders all com-
petition ineffective) and remains at zero until high values
of competition exist, while the equilibrium level of com-
petition can get very large and grow very quickly, espe-
cially when policing is costly. Together, these trait
associations result in a negative relationship between the
equilibrium values of policing and relatedness – the high
levels of competition favored in populations with low
relatedness create a strong selective pressure favoring
policing behavior and overcome the weakness of kin
selection in less genetically structured groups. Thus, the
joint equilibrium relationship between relatedness and policing
is the opposite of the dynamical one. It is this difference
between the dynamic and equilibrium relationship to
relatedness that has led some to interpret policing as an
alternative to kin selection. Our dynamic model reveals
the source of this confusion.
Our evolutionary genetic approach also reveals the exist-
ence of planes of stable, interior equilibria. For a fixed
level of policing, there exists a plane of stable equilibria
Equilibrium values of competition and policing Figure 4
Equilibrium values of competition and policing. Equilibrium values of competition as a function of the level of policing (a) 
and the cost of policing (a) (figures 4A and 4C), and equilibrium values of policing as a function of the level of competition (z) 
and the cost of policing (c) (figures 4B and 4D).BMC Evolutionary Biology 2007, 7:203 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/7/203
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with competitive specialists and a less competitive, self-
policing class (Figures 3 and 4). Similarly, the evolution of
policing with a fixed level of competition gives rise to
planes of stable gene frequency equilibria with policing
and non-policing individuals (Brandvain unpublished).
These non-policing individuals are cheaters or free-riders
by virtue of the fact that they bear none of the costs of
policing but reap the reward of reduced within-group
resource competition. Together, these findings indicate
that neither trait may reach the ultimate evolutionary out-
come characterized by optimizing the mean fitness func-
tion. Our further analyses of the one-trait models, adding
mutant alleles causing increased competition or reduced
policing, respectively, result in the population moving
from one region of stable equilibria to another, toward
the ultimate outcomes predicted by Frank's model. Thus,
our regions of stable equilibria are invasible by mutations
and the ESS coincides with that predicted by Frank and his
collaborators. However, rates of evolution can be very
slow and depend upon the fortuitous input of a continu-
ing series of mutations with effects of a particular kind
occurring in the right order with respect to the equilib-
rium. Thus, when both traits are evolving simultaneously,
there is reason to question whether the ESS can be
achieved.
We used a two-locus model to investigate the simultane-
ous evolution of competition and policing. Like individ-
ual selection models with multiplicative fitnesses,
selection in this model does not generate linkage disequi-
librium between the competition and policing loci. As a
result, the evolution of each trait is affected by the geno-
typic mean value of the other (playing the role of the fixed
levels in the one locus model). Hence, we find similar
regions of stable two-locus equilibria, with mixed levels of
both competition and policing behaviors. Similarly, we
find that mutant alleles at either locus can invade these
stable equilibria. However, depending on the order and
magnitude of the mutational effects introduced, the pop-
ulation can move either toward or away from the ultimate
evolutionary outcome. Thus, achieving the joint ESS
depends not only on the occurrence of mutations for
policing and competitive ability but also on the mutations
occurring in the right order, a much more onerous
requirement than in the one-locus models. As a result, a
population's sojourn away from the ESS may be extremely
long and we should expect diversity among species (or
among populations of the same species) in levels of com-
petition and policing.
Biological Implications
In some circumstances, different genes can experience dif-
ferent values of relatedness. For example, maternally
inherited mitochondrial genes can be more closely related
than diploid nuclear genes and the mating system can
change both the absolute and relative values [35]. In
genomic imprinting (the differential expression of a gene
based on its parent of origin), a similar situation arises
within the broods of multiply mated females: siblings are
more closely related for maternally derived alleles than
they are for paternally derived alleles. High relatedness of
paternally derived alleles in monogamous or inbred sib-
cohorts selects for self restraint of paternally derived com-
petitive alleles, while low relatedness of siblings from
multiple mated mothers will select for increased levels of
competitive effort of paternally derived alleles [36].
Because our model allows for the separation of probabil-
ity of ibd by parent of origin and because we show that
policing is favored by selection between groups, we pre-
dict that the high competition of paternally-derived alleles
will result in increased policing by maternally derived
alleles.
Because genes in separate species are not closely related,
policing has been invoked in this way: "the study of inter-
specific mutualistic associations offers the opportunity to
explore the mechanisms ...that maintain cooperative
behavior even in the absence of kin selection" ([37] p.
254; see also [13] p. 520). This view of policing has moti-
vated the use of non-genetic, economic-optimum models
of co-evolution to understand the evolution of symbioses.
The evolution of conflict reduction without relatedness
appears to provide an important alternative explanation
for major transitions in evolution. In this view, policing
(sometimes called sanctioning) evolves under very low
relatedness and is an alternative to kin selection, which
also favors decreased competitive ability. We have shown
that policing is not an alternative to kin-group selection,
thus, although policing could be an important force in the
evolution of symbioses [38], especially in cases of co-
inheritance [7,35,39], it does not offer a new class of evo-
lutionary explanation.
While the population genetic models of policing and
competition presented in this paper highlight both the
dynamics of the evolution and the conflicting forces of
selection within and between groups, Frank's models are
more analytically tractable and both models make the
same predictions about the long term evolutionary out-
come of natural selection. Thus, these complementary
approaches provided a clearer view of the evolutionary
forces involved in competition and policing behaviors.
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